- DI & DS
- English Language
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Intelligence & CR
- Alphabet & Number Ranking
- Analytical Reasoning
- Blood Relations Test
- Coding - Decoding
- Comparision of Ranks
- Direction Sense Test
- Mathematical Operation / Number Puzzles
- Series
- Sitting Arrangement
- Statement and Arguement
- Statement and Conclusion
- Statement and Course of Action
- Statement-Assumption
- Syllogism
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Mathematical Skills
- Average
- Calender
- Clocks
- Geometry
- Height and Distance
- Logarithms
- Mensuration
- Mixtures and Alligations
- Number System
- Percentage
- Permutation and Computation
- Probability
- Profit and Loss
- Ratio and Proportion
- Set Theory
- Simple calculations
- Simple Equations
- Simple Interest and Compound Interest
- Time and Work
- Time, Speed and Distance
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13.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. Giving birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers; each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term ‘role’ is an appropriate one, because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope-walker....All his behaviour seems to us a game....But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe.
The American sociologist Erving Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous; we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part ‘tongue in cheek’. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.[1] What is the thematic highlight of this passage?
(1) In the absence of strong biological linkages, reciprocal roles provide the mechanism for coordinating human behaviour.
(2) In the absence of reciprocal roles, biological linkages provide the mechanism for coordinating human behaviour.
(3) Human behaviour is independent of biological linkages and reciprocal roles.
(4) Human behaviour depends on biological linkages and reciprocal roles.
(5) Reciprocal roles determine normative human behavior in society.
[2] Which of the following would have been true if biological linkages structured human society?
(1) The role of mother would have been defined through her reciprocal relationship with her children.
(2) We would not have been offended by the father playing his role ‘tongue in cheek’.
(3) Women would have adopted and fostered children rather than giving birth to them.
(4) Even if warlords were physically weaker than their followers, they would still dominate them.
(5) Waiters would have stronger motivation to serve their customers.[3] It has been claimed in the passage that “some roles are more absorbing than others”. According to passage, which of the following seem(s) appropriate reason(s) for such a claim?
A. Some roles carry great expectations from the society preventing manifestation of the true self.
B. Society ascribes so much importance to some roles that the conception of self may get aligned with the roles being performed.
C. Some roles require development of skill and expertise leaving little time for manifestation of self.
(1) A only
(2) B only
(3) C only
(4) A & B
(5) B & Casked in CAT
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14.
The difficulties historians face in establishing cause-and-effect relations in the history of human societies are broadly similar to the difficulties facing astronomers, climatologists, ecologists, evolutionary biologists, geologists, and palaeontologists. To varying degrees each of these fields is plagued by the impossibility of performing replicated, controlled experimental interventions, the complexity arising from enormous numbers of variables, the resulting uniqueness of each system, the consequent impossibility of formulating universal laws, and the difficulties of predicting emergent properties and future behaviour. Prediction in history, as in other historical sciences, is most feasible on large spatial scales and over long times, when the unique features of millions of small-scale brief events become averaged out. Just as I could predict the sex ratio of the next 1,000 newborns but not the sexes of my own two children, the historian can recognize factors that made inevitable the broad outcome of the collision between American and Eurasian societies after 13,000 years of separate developments, but not the outcome of the 1960 U.S. presidential election. The details of which candidate said what during a single televised debate in October 1960 Could have given the electoral victory to Nixon instead of to Kennedy, but no details of who said what could have blocked the European conquest of Native Americans.
How can students of human history profit from the experience of scientists in other historical sciences? A methodology that has proved useful involves the comparative method and so-called natural experiments. While neither astronomers studying galaxy formation nor human historians can manipulate their systems in controlled laboratory experiments, they both can take advantage of natural experiments, by comparing systems differing in the presence or absence (or in the strong or weak effect) of some putative causative factor. For example, epidemiologists, forbidden to feed large amounts of salt to people experimentally, have still been able to identify effects of high salt intake by comparing groups of humans who already differ greatly in their salt intake; and cultural anthropologists, unable to provide human groups experimentally with varying resource abundances for many centuries, still study long-term effects of resource abundance on human societies by comparing recent Polynesian populations living on islands differing naturally in resource abundance.
The student of human history can draw on many more natural experiments than just comparisons among the five inhabited continents. Comparisons can also utilize large islands that have developed complex societies in a considerable degree of isolation (such as Japan, Madagascar, Native American Hispaniola, New Guinea, Hawaii, and many others), as well as societies on hundreds of smaller islands and regional societies within each of the continents. Natural experiments in any field, whether in ecology or human history, are inherently open to potential methodological criticisms. Those include confounding effects of natural variation in additional variables besides the one of interest, as well as problems in inferring chains of causation from observed correlations between variables. Such methodological problems have been discussed in great detail for some of the historical sciences. In particular, epidemiology, the science of drawing inferences about human diseases by comparing groups of people (often by retrospective historical studies), has for a long time successfully employed formalized procedures for dealing with problems similar to those facing historians of human societies.
In short, I acknowledge that it is much more difficult to understand human history than to understand problems in fields of science where history is unimportant and where fewer individual variables operate. Nevertheless, successful methodologies for analyzing historical problems have been worked out in several fields. As a result, the histories of dinosaurs, nebulae, and glaciers are generally acknowledged to belong to fields of science rather than to the humanities.[1] Why do islands with considerable degree of isolation provide valuable insights into human history?
(1) Isolated islands may evolve differently and this difference is of interest to us.
(2) Isolated islands increase the number of observations available to historians.
(3) Isolated islands, differing in their endowments and size may evolve differently and this difference can be attributed to their endowments and size.
(4) Isolated islands, in so far as they are inhabited, arouse curiosity about how human beings evolved there.[2] According to the author, why is prediction difficult in history?
(1) Historical explanations are usually broad so that no prediction is possible.
(2) Historical out comers depend upon a large number of factors and hence predictions is difficult for each case.
(3) Historical sciences, by their very nature, are not interested in a multitude of minor factors, which might be important in a specific historical outcome.
(4) Historians are interested in evolution of human history and hence are only interested in log term predictions.
(5) Historical sciences suffer from the inability to conduct controlled experiments and therefore have explanations based on a few long-term factors.[3] According to the author, which of the following statements would be true?
(1) Students of history are missing significant opportunities by not conducting any natural experiments.
(2) Complex societies inhabiting large islands provide great opportunities for natural experiments.
(3) Students of history are missing significant opportunities by not studying an adequate variety of natural experiments.
(4) A unique problem faced by historians is their inability to establish cause and effect relationships.
(5) Cultural anthropologists have overcome the problem of confounding variables through natural experiments.
asked in CAT
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15.
To discover the relation between rules, paradigms, and normal science, consider first how the historian isolates the particular loci of commitment that have been described as accepted rules. Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community's paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade. The historian, of course, will discover in addition a penumbral area occupied by achievements whose status is still in doubt, but the core of solved problems and techniques will usually be clear. Despite occasional ambiguities, the paradigms of a mature scientific community can be determined with relative ease.
That demands a second step and one of a somewhat different kind. When undertaking it, the historian must compare the community's paradigms with each other and with its current research reports. In doing so, his object is to discover what isolable elements, explicit or implicit, the members of that community may have abstracted from their more global paradigms and deploy it as rules in their research. Anyone who has attempted to describe or analyze the evolution of a particular scientific tradition will necessarily have sought accepted principles and rules of this sort. Almost certainly, he will have met with at least partial success. But, if his experience has been at all like my own, he will have found the search for rules both more difficult and less satisfying than the search for paradigms. Some of the generalizations he employs to describe the community's shared beliefs will present more problems. Others, however, will seem a shade too strong. Phrased in just that way, or in any other way he can imagine, they would almost certainly have been rejected by some members of the group he studies. Nevertheless, if the coherence of the research tradition is to be understood in terms of rules, some specification of common ground in the corresponding area is needed. As a result, the search for a body of rules competent to constitute a given normal research tradition becomes a source of continual and deep frustration.
Recognizing that frustration, however, makes it possible to diagnose its source. Scientists can agree that a Newton, Lavoisier, Maxwell, or Einstein has produced an apparently permanent solution to a group of outstanding problems and still disagree, sometimes without being aware of it, about the particular abstract characteristics that make those solutions permanent. They can, that is, agree in their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. Normal science can be determined in part by the direct inspection of paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does not depend upon the formulation of rules and assumption. Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists.[1] What is the author attempting to illustrate through this passage?
(1) Relationships between rules, paradigms, and normal science.
(2) How a historian would isolate a particular ‘loci of commitment’.
(3) How a set of shared beliefs evolve in to a paradigm.
(4) Ways of understanding a scientific tradition.
(5) The frustrations of attempting to define a paradigm of a tradition.[2] The term ‘loci of commitment’ as used in the passage would most likely correspond with which of the following?
(1) Loyalty between a group of scientists in a research laboratory.
(2) Loyalty between groups of scientists across research laboratories.
(3) Loyalty to a certain paradigm of scientific inquiry.
(4) Loyalty to global patterns of scientific inquiry.
(5) Loyalty to evolving trends of scientific inquiry.[3] The author of this passage is likely to agree with which of the following?
(1) Paradigms almost entirely define a scientific tradition.
(2) A group of scientists investigating a phenomenon would benefit by defining a set of rules.
(3) Acceptance by the giants of a tradition is a sine qua non for a paradigm to emerge.
(4) Choice of isolation mechanism determines the types of paradigm that may emerge from a tradition.
(5) Paradigms are a general representation of rules and beliefs of a scientific tradition.asked in CAT
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16.
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17.
A remarkable aspect of art of the present century is the range of concepts and ideologies which it embodies. It is almost tempting to see a pattern emerging within the art field – or alternatively imposed upon it a posteriori – similar to that which exists under the umbrella of science where the general term covers a whole range of separate, though interconnecting, activities. Any parallelism is however – in this instance at least – misleading. A scientific discipline develops systematically once its bare tenets have been established, named and categorized as conventions. Many of the concepts of modern art, by contrast, have resulted from the almost accidental meetings of groups of talented individuals at certain times and certain places. The ideas generated by these chance meetings had twofold consequences. Firstly, a corpus of work would be produced which, in great part, remains as a concrete record of the events. Secondly, the ideas would themselves be disseminated through many different channels of communication – seeds that often bore fruit in contexts far removed from their generation. Not all movements were exclusively concerned with innovation. Surrealism, for instance, claimed to embody a kind of insight which can be present in the art of any period. This claim has been generally accepted so that a sixteenth century painting by Spranger or a mysterious photograph by Atget can legitimately be discussed in surrealist terms. Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of many different (often fundamentally different) kinds and resulted from the exposures of painters, sculptors and thinkers to the more complex phenomena of the twentieth century, including our ever increasing knowledge of the thought and products of earlier centuries. Different groups of artists would collaborate in trying to make sense of rapidly changing world of visual and spiritual experience. We should hardly be surprised if no one group succeeded completely, but achievements, through relative, have been considerable. Landmarks have been established – concrete statements of position which give a pattern to a situation which could easily have degenerated into total chaos. Beyond this, new language tools have been created for those who follow – semantic systems which can provide a springboard for further explorations.
The codifying of art is often criticized. Certainly one can understand that artists are wary of being pigeon-holed since they are apt to think of themselves as individuals – sometimes with good reason. The notion of self-expression, however, no longer carries quite the weight it once did; objectivity has its defenders. There is good reason to accept the ideas codified by artists and critics, over the past sixty years or so, as having attained the status of independent existence – an independence which is not without its own value. This time factor is important here. As an art movement slips into temporal perspective, it ceases to be a living organism – becoming, rather, a fossil. This is not to say it becomes useless or uninteresting. Just as a scientist can reconstruct the life of a prehistoric environment from the messages codified into the structure of a fossil, so can an artist decipher whole webs of intellectual and creative possibility from the recorded structure of a ‘dead’ art movement. The artist can match the creative patterns crystallized into this structure against the potentials and possibilities of his own time. AS T.S Eliot observed, no one starts anything from scratch; however consciously you may try to live in the present, you are still involved with a nexus of behaviour patterns bequeathed from the past. The original and creative person is not someone who ignores these patterns, but someone who is able to translate and develop them so that they confirm more exactly to his – and our – present needs.[1] Many of the concepts of modern art have been the product of
(1) ideas generated from planned deliberations between artists, painters and thinkers.
(2) the dissemination of ideas through the state and its organizations.
(3) accidental interactions among people blessed with creative muse.
(4) patronage by the rich and powerful that supported art.
(5) systematic investigation, codification and conventions.[2] In the passage, the word ‘fossil’ can be interpreted as
(1) an art movement that has ceased to remain interesting or useful.
(2) an analogy from the physical world to indicate a historic art movement.
(3) an analogy from the physical world to indicate the barrenness of artistic creations in the past.
(4) an embedded codification of pre-historic life.
(5) an analogy from the physical world to indicate the passing of an era associated with an art movement.[3] In the passage, which of the following similarities between science and art may lead to erroneous conclusions?
(1) Both, in general, include a gamut of distinct but interconnecting activites.
(2) Both have movements not necessarily concerned with innovation.
(3) Both depend on collaborations between talented individuals.
(4) Both involve abstract thought and dissemination of ideas.
(5) Both reflect complex priorities of the modern world.[4] The range of concepts and ideologies embodied in the art of the twentieth century is explained by
(1) the existence of movements such as surrealism.
(2) landmarks which give a pattern to the art history of the twentieth century.
(3) new language tools which can be used for further explorations into new areas.
(4) the fast changing world of perceptual and transcendental understandings.
(5) the quick exchange of ideas and concepts enabled by efficient technology.[5] The passage uses an observation by T.S. Eliot to imply that
(1) creative processes are not ‘original’ because they always borrow from the past.
(2) we always carry forward the legacy of the past.
(3) past behaviours and thought processes recreate themselves in the present and get labeled as ‘original’ or ‘creative’.
(4) ‘originality’ can only thrive in a ‘greenhouse’ insulated from the past biases.
(5) ‘innovations’ and ‘original thinking’ interpret and develop on past thoughts to suit contemporary needs.[6] According to the passage, which of the following best represents the factor that has been cited by the author in the context of Rwanda and Haiti?
(1) Various ethnic groups competing for land and other resources
(2) Various ethnic groups competing for limited land resources
(3) Various ethnic groups fighting wit each other
(4) Various ethnic groups competing for political power
(5) Various ethnic groups fighting for their identity[7] By an anthropogenic drought, the author means
(1) A drought caused by lack of rains.
(2) A drought caused due to deforestation
(3) A drought caused by failure to prevent bracken ferns from overrunning the fields.
(4) A drought caused by actions of human beings.
(5) A drought caused by climate changes.[8] According to the passage, the drought at the time of Maya collapse had a different impact compared to the droughts earlier because
(1) The Maya kings continue to be extravagant when common people were suffering.
(2) It happened at the time of collapse of leadership among Mayas.
(3) It happened when the Maya population had occupied all available land suited for agriculture.
(4) It was followed by internecine warfare among Mayans.
(5) Irreversible environmental degradation led to this drought.[9] According to the author, why is it difficult to explain the reasons for Maya collapse?
(1) Copan inhabitants destroyed all records of that period.
(2) The constant deforestation and hillside erosion have wiped out all traces of the Maya kingdom.
(3) Archaeological sites of Mayas do not provide any consistent evidence.
(4) It has not been possible to ascertain which of the factors best explains as to why the Maya civilization collapsed.
(5) At least five million people were crammed into a small area.[10] Which factor has not been cited as one of the factors causing the collapse of Maya society?
(1) Environmental degradation due to excess population
(2) Social collapse due to excess population
(3) Increased warfare among Maya people
(4) Climate change
(5) Obsession of Maya population with their own short-term concerns.asked in CAT
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18.
When I was little, children were bought two kinds of ice cream, sold from those white wagons with the canopies made of silvery metal: either the two-cent cone or the four-cent ice cream pie. The two-cent cone was very small, in fact it could fit comfortably into a child's hand, and it was made by taking the ice cream from its container with a special scoop and piling it on the cone. Granny always suggested I eat only a part of the cone, then throw away the pointed end, because it had been touched by the vendor's hand (though that was the best part, nice and crunchy, and it was regularly eaten in secret, after a pretense of discarding it).
The four-cent pie was made by a special little machine, also silvery, which pressed two disks of sweet biscuit against a cylindrical section of ice cream. First you had to thrust your tongue into the gap between the biscuits until it touched the central nucleus of ice cream; then, gradually, you ate the whole thing, the biscuit surfaces softening as they became soaked in creamy nectar. Granny had no advice to give here: in theory the pies had been touched only by the machine; in practice, the vendor had held them against his hand while giving them to us, but it was impossible to isolate the contaminated area.
I was fascinated, however, by some of my peers, whose parents bought them not a four-cent pie but two two-cent cones. These privileged children advanced proudly with one cone in their right hand and one in their left; and expertly moving their head from side to side, they licked first one, then the other. This liturgy seemed to me so sumptuously enviable, that many times I asked to be allowed to celebrate it. In vain. My elders were inflexible: a four-cent ice, yes; but two two-cent ones, absolutely no.
As anyone can see, neither mathematics nor economy nor dietetics justified this refusal. Nor did hygiene, assuming that in due course the tips of both cones were discarded. The pathetic, and obviously mendacious, justification was that a boy concerned with turning his eyes from one cone to the other was more inclined to stumble over stones, steps, or cracks in the pavement. I dimly sensed that there was another secret justification, cruelly pedagogical, but I was unable to grasp it.
Today, citizen and victim of a consumer society, a civilization of excess and waste (which the society of the thirties was not), I realize that those dear and now departed elders were right. Two two-cent cones instead of one at four cents did not signify squandering, economically speaking, but symbolically they surely did. It was for this precise reason, that I yearned for them: because two ice creams suggested excess. And this was precisely why they were denied me: because they looked indecent, an insult to poverty, a display of fictitious privilege, a boast of wealth. Only spoiled children ate two cones at once, those children who in fairy tales were rightly punished, as Pinocchio was when he rejected the skin and the stalk. And parents who encouraged this weakness, appropriate to little parvenus, were bringing up their children in the foolish theater of "I'd like to but I can't." They were preparing them to turn up at tourist-class cheek-in with a fake Gucci bag bought from a street peddler on the beach at Rimini.
Nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality, in a world where the consumer civilization now wants even adults to be spoiled, and promises them always something more, from the wristwatch in the box of detergent to the bonus bangle sheathed, with the magazine it accompanies, in a plastic envelope. Like the parents of those ambidextrous gluttons I so envied, the consumer civilization pretends to give more, but actually gives, for four cents, what is worth four cents. You will throw away the old transistor radio to purchase the new one, that boasts an alarm clock as well, but some inexplicable defect in the mechanism will guarantee that the radio lasts only a year. The new cheap car will have leather seats, double side mirrors adjustable from inside, and a paneled dashboard, but it will not last nearly so long as the glorious old Fiat 500, which, even when it broke down, could be started again with a kick.
The morality of the old days made Spartans of us all, while today's morality wants all of us to be Sybarites.[1] Which of the following cannot be inferred from the passage?
(1) Today’s society is more extravagant than the society of the 1930s.
(2) The act of eating two ice cream cones is akin to a ceremonial process.
(3) Elders rightly suggested that a boy turning eyes from one cone to the other was more likely to fall.
(4) Despite seeming to promise more, the consumer civilization gives away exactly what the thing is worth.
(5) The consumer civilization attempts to spoil children and adults alike.[2] In the passage, the phrase “little parvenus” refers to
(1) naughty midgets.
(2) old hags.
(3) arrogant people.
(4) young upstarts.
(5) foolish kids.[3] The author pined for two-cent cones instead of one four-cent pie because
(1) it made dietetic sense.
(2) it suggested intemperance.
(3) it was more fun.
(4) it had a visual appeal.
(5) he was a glutton.[4] What does the author mean by “nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality”?
(1) The moralist of yesterday have become immoral today.
(2) The concept of morality has changed over the years.
(3) Consumerism is amoral.
(4) The risks associated with immorality have gone up.
(5) The purist’s view of morality is fast becoming popular.[5] According to the author, the justification for refusal to let him eat two cones was plausibly
(1) didactic.
(2) dietetic.
(3) dialectic.
(4) diatonic.
(5) diastolic.asked in CAT
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